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W A P P E A L S 
JOSE ORTIZ- I JRIBE, : Case N< K 981 224 
1 1,;; dntifi ' AppeiLtiii, : Dist .ric t Court No . 974402506 
v. : Category 15 
1 AI JRTE ORTIZ-URIBE, : 
Defendant Appellee. ' ; : 
JURISDICTION O F T H E C O U R T 
1 he I Hah ( V'lii" i>i Appc;iN "' ' M ' 'uis "i i j juul |IMIM1ICII<>M ' ll"« nnHr i > i tcordance 
-
 r
-,-i- v Hi, Section 5 of the Constitution of Utah and Utah Code Annotated 78-2a-
3(2)(h; (I9M6; 
S T A T E M E N T Ot ; ISSUES P R E S E N T E D FOR REVIEW 
The issues on appeal relate to the trial court awarding al imony. The Appellant 
contends that the trial court committed error in awarding alimony and relies up m ihivi lint nil 
reasoning to '"" 1" l11 * "" ! ,|,;<: 1" '• ,: "',| ion ; . . •  ..-. 
1 • v* hether the Trial Court Erre4 by Awarding Alimony to a Party Who Had 
* '• hahiied Since the Date of Separation? 
Deten tl lei gi vet i, ch cumstances constitute "cohabitation, is in reality a 
mixed question of fact and law , and the appellate court is not bound b) the conclusion reached 
by the trial court In reviewing a trial court's actions in a divorce case, the appellate :oi n I: is 
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vested with broad equitable powers. Haddow v. Haddow. 707 P.2d 669, 671 (Utah 1985). 
Challenging Findings of Fact in a divorce action utilized a clearly erroneous standard. Barnes 
v. Barnes. 857 P.2d 257, 259 (Utah App. 1993). Issues of law are reviewed under the 
correction of error standard. Bingham v. Bingham. 872 P.2d 1065, 1067 (Utah App. 1994). 
The Appellant preserved this issue for appeal through the examination of multiple 
witnesses regarding the issue of cohabitation (T. 10, 17, 29, 34). This issue was further 
preserved for appeal by the trial court's finding that the Respondent had not cohabited since 
the parties' separation (R. 19). 
2. Whether the Trial Court Erred by Awarding Alimony Retroactively to the Time 
of Separation? 
This is an issue of law requiring the trial court's conclusions to be reviewed for 
correctness. Bingham v. Bingham. 872 P.2d 1065,1067 (Utah App. 1994). 
This issue was preserved for appeal by the trial court's finding which awarded alimony 
retroactively to the time of separation (R. 18). 
3. Whether the trial court erred in awarding alimony by failing to consider the 
financial ability and needs of the parties? 
This is an issue of law which requires the trial court's conclusions to reviewed for 
correctness. Bingham v. Bingham. 872 P.2d 1065.1067 (Utah App. 1994). 
This issue is preserved for appeal by the trial court's finding which based the award of 
alimony primarily on the disparity of the income of the parties (R. 18). 
i 
DISPOSITIVE STATUTES & RULES 
The interpretation of the following statutes and rules are important in resolving the 
issues on appeal in this matter: < 
2 
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I Hah Code '\nnofiilniI \[Vl-\ (1993). 
(1) In any action tiled : > establish an ordci ^T alimom . oi ;li ision of 
proper!> in a domestic case, the court ma\ ^rdei a part) to pa\ the ^ost^ 
m o n e u during me pendenc} of the action, for the separate support and 
maintenance of the other par t ) . . . 
I Jtah Code A I L . .. - ^u-3-5(7)(a)-(d) (Supp. 1998) 
(a) The ,. n ^hM consider at least the foil*• . in determining 
alimony: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the iccipient spouse. 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability u* produce income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support: and 
(iv) the length of the marriage, 
(b) I he court may consider the fault of the
 r \ u i - - .n Je-.u mining .ihmom 
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard ot living, existing at 
the time of separation, in determining alimony in aca>tdance with Subsection 
(<o However, the coun shall considci all relevant facts and equitable principles 
and may. in its discretion, base alimony on the standard of living that existed at 
the time of rrial In marriages of short duration, when no children have been 
conceived or born during the marriage, the court may consider the standard of 
living that existed at the time of the marriage 
(d) The court may. under appropriate circumstances attempt to equalize the 
parties ' respective standard- of h u n g 
Utah Code Annotated J U - 3 - 5 ( 9 ) 
A m order of the court that a pai t> pa\ alimony to a former spouse terminates 
upon establishment h\ the party paying alimom •!> v :ht.- lormer spouse is 
r *!v;hi!:uinr " i'H r - ' -h / 1 -• '»:<*" 
I Jtah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 3(b) 
. Rule 3. Commencement of action f I > ) 1 ime of '
 ( "ut i $'< fiction 
The court shall have jurisdiction from the nine oi tiling of the complaint or 
service of the summons and a cop} of die compiai-
3 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case & Proceedings Below. 
, This appeal is from a final judgment or decree awarding alimony in the divorce 
proceeding between the parties. 
1. The Petitioner, Jose Rafael Ortiz-Uribe filed a Petition for Divorce on November 12, 
1997 (R. 2). The Respondent, Laurie Ortiz-Uribe, answered the Petition for Divorce on 
December 8, 1997 (R. 7). 
2. A Request for Trial Setting was filed by the Petitioner on December 10, 1997 (R. 9). 
At the pre-trial settlement and scheduling conference held on February 23, 1998, a trial date was 
scheduled to try the issues of alimony and debts (R. 12, 13). 
3. The matter came for trial on March 17, 1998. At the conclusion of the trial, the trial 
court entered its Ruling which was subsequently incorporated into Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law, and Decree of Divorce (R. 20, 23). 
4. The Petitioner filed his Notice of Appeal on April 21, 1998 (R. 25). 
B. Statement of Facts. 
Jose Rafael Ortiz-Uribe (Ortiz) and Laurie Ortiz-Uribe (Uribe) first married on the 24th 
day of December, 1984. That marriage was annulled due to the incapacity of Ms. Uribe to marry 
because she was not divorced from her previous husband. (R. 20, Tr. 40). The parties 
subsequently remarried on November 21, 1985. (R. 19, Tr. 40). 
In August of 1996, the parties separated.. (R. 19). Mr. Ortiz filed a petition for divorce on 
November 12, 1997. (R. 2). A trial on the matter was heard on March 17, 1998, to determine 
4 
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issues of alimony and debts. (R. 13). Prior to the trial date, Ms. Uribe did not request a 
temporary order for alimony. 
Following the parties separation, Ms. Uribe had different men living with her in her 
mobile home. Ms. Uribe admitted to having a relationship with a Brady Dalton with whom they 
had sexual relations on a frequent basis. (Tr. 21-22). Though he rented an apartment up the street 
from Ms. Uribe, he was at the home of Ms. Uribe frequently during the days and nights. (Tr. 15, 
22). The two also spent time together at Dalton's apartment. (Tr. 22). Ms. Uribe took care of 
Dalton's things, and Dalton took care of her things. (Tr. 22). Dalton had frequent use of Ms. 
Uribe's car (Tr. 14, 31), and helped buy tires for the car. (Tr. 22). It appeared as though Ms. 
Uribe and Dalton were living together in Ms. Uribe's trailer as boyfriend and girlfriend. (Tr. 31). 
Dalton acted as though he were the man of the house. (Tr. 34). On January 23, 1998, Dalton 
died in Ms. Uribe's bed, accidentally overdosing on cocaine (Tr. 22-23). 
Shortly after Brady Dalton's death, a Michael Withers died in the home of Ms. Uribe. He 
overdosed on heroin. (Tr. 23). Ms. Uribe also had Jack and Jake Nyland living at her house 
following the separation. (Tr. 16). They were long time friends. (Tr. 24). 
Mr. Ortiz earned $23,000 in 1997 (Tr. 12), and reported on his financial declaration that 
his monthly income was $1,960. (Tr. 47). Mr. Ortiz listed his financial needs on his financial 
declaration and testified that those needs were as outlined on his financial declaration.1 
]The financial declarations prepared and submitted by the parties are not in the court's file 
at this time. The appellant has no explanation for this, and only became aware of this fact when 
preparing for this appeal. The court clerk could not locate or provide an explanation as to why 
the financial declarations were not in the file. The record indicates that the trial court 
acknowledged receiving the financial declarations and referred to them during the trial. The 
court indicated that it had received Ms. Uribe's financial declaration at the pre-trial. (Tr. 19). 
The Court's Minute Entry indicates that Mr. Ortiz filed a financial declaration with the court 
5 
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At the time of trial, Ms. Uribe was working as a supervisor of housekeeping and laundry 
at the Hidden Hollow Care Center, where she had worked for over a year. (Tr. 18). Ms. Uribe 
worked 40 hours a week and earned $7.75. (Tr. 18-21). Though Ms. Uribe acknowledged 
earning $310 a week (Tr. 21), she reported a gross monthly income of $835.53 on her financial 
declaration. (Tr. 47). Ms. Uribe testified that her monthly financial needs totaled $660. (Tr. 19-
20). 
Based upon Mr. Ortiz's earnings as set forth in his financial declaration, $1,960 a month, 
and Ms. Uribe's earnings as set forth in her financial declaration, $835.53 a month, the trial court 
granted Ms. Uribe's request of $200 a month alimony. The alimony award was based on the 
disparity of income of the parties. (R. 18) (Tr. 47). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Following the parties separation in August of 1996, Ms. Uribe cohabited with one or 
more men. It is clear that Ms. Uribe resided with a person of the opposite sex with whom she 
was having a sexual relationship. It was an abuse of the trial court's equitable powers in 
awarding alimony. 
It was improper for the trial court to award alimony retroactively. The trial did not have 
jurisdiction to award alimony retroactively to August of 1996, the time of separation. 
Jurisdiction for the court should have commenced from the time of the filing of the petition for 
divorce or service of the summons and a copy of the petition. In addition, Ms. Uribe did not 
during his opening statements at the trial. (R. 15). Appellant has made copies of the financial 
declarations from his own file and attached as an addendum for the Appellate Court's reference. 
Mr. Ortiz listed his financial needs which totaled $1,500. 
6 
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request separate support and maintenance during the pendency of the action. She established no 
financial need prior to the entry of the divorce decree. 
The trial court failed to recognize and consider essential factors in determining whether 
alimony should be awarded: (1) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; (2) the 
ability of the receiving spouse to produce a sufficient income for herself; and (3) the ability of the 
responding spouse to provide support. The trial court considered the length of the marriage and 
based alimony on the disparity of income of the parties. Reviewing the financial conditions and 
needs of the parties, there is not a disparity of income. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY AWARDING ALIMONY TO MS. URIBE 
WHERE SHE COHABITED WITH ANOTHER PERSON FOLLOWING THE 
PARTIES SEPARATION. 
In Utah, it is well established that cohabitation warrants termination of alimony. Barber 
v. Barber. 792 P.2d 134, 136 (Utah App. 1990). Utah Code Annotated 30-3-5(9) states: "Any 
order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse terminates upon establishment by 
the party paying alimony that the former spouse is cohabitating with another person." Id.. There 
have been various versions of this statute in use during the past few years, but the court of 
appeals has determined that the semantic distinctions regarding cohabitation are inconsequential. 
"Cohabitation is comprised of the same two elements: (1) common residency and (2) sexual 
contact evidencing a conjugal association." Pendleton v. Pendleton. 918 P.2d 159, 160 [FN1] 
(Utah App. 1996); citing Haddow. v. Haddow. 707 P.2d 669, 672 (Utah 1985). 
7 
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As in Pendelton, at 160, sexual contact by Ms. Uribe has been admitted. Ms. Uribe 
admitted to having a relationship with Brady Dalton with whom they had sexual relations on a 
frequent basis. (Tr. 21-22). In marshalling the evidence to support the trial court's finding that 
Ms. Uribe did not cohabit following the separation, the element of residency must be addressed. 
The only evidence presented at trial establishing that there was not a common residency was 
through the testimony of Ms. Uribe. When asked whether it was true that Brady Dalton lived in 
her home, she responded "No, it's not. He stayed there. I can't say whether he's living there or 
not. He did stay there overnight once in awhile, and sometimes during the day." (Tr. 21-22). She 
further testified that Dalton rented an apartment just up the street from her place. (Tr. 22). Uribe 
denied that she and Dalton carried on as though they were husband and wife. (Tr. 22). Uribe also 
denied that Dalton contributed to her financial support, though he did help her buy tires for the 
car. (Tr.22). 
Ms. Uribe herself admitted that Brady Dalton lived at her place on a frequent basis. 
During her cross examination of Mr. Ortiz, Uribe stated "Yes, he did drive my car. Yes, he 
stayed overnight there quite often." (Tr. 15-16). She then asked "Who else lived at my house?" 
(Tr. 16), of which Ortiz answered "Who else? I know Jack and Jake Nylund. (Tr. 16). Uribe 
then responded through her next question, "Right, Jack and Jake Nylund lived at the house". (Tr. 
16). Uribe then compared Brady Dalton to Jack and Jake Nylund as just friends staying with her. 
The problem with this comparison, or at least as admitted to by Uribe, is that she had frequent 
sexual contact with Dalton, evidencing a conjugal association. 
It appeared to Robert Bosserman, as though Ms. Uribe and Dalton were living together in 
Ms. Uribe's trailer as boyfriend and girlfriend. (Tr. 31). Dalton appeared to live there (Tr. 32) as 
8 
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he drove Uribe's car (Tr. 30), and used Uribe's household items as though he were the man of 
the house. (Tr. 34). Another witness, Ramon Perez, went to Ms. Uribe's mobile home a couple 
of times a month to pick up his mail which was delivered there from Mexico. (Tr. 35). Each 
time Perez went to the mobile home, Brady Dalton was there. On one occasion, Perez observed 
Uribe and Dalton sleeping in her bed. (Tr. 36). Dalton actually died in Uribe's bed, accidentally 
overdosing on cocaine. (Tr. 22-23). 
According to Uribe, she would also go to Dalton's apartment on a frequent basis? (Tr. 
22). The fact that Dalton rented a separate apartment, does not in and of itself defeat the element 
of a common residency. Common residency means "the sharing of a common abode that both 
parties consider their principal domicile for more than a temporary or brief period of time." Sigg 
v. Sigg. 905 P.2d 908, 917 (Utah App. 1995), citing Haddow. at 672. In Sigg, it was determined 
that when Ms. Sigg returned from New Zealand, she and her paramour "in effect resided 
together," even though they had separate condominiums. "The two had a sexual relationship, 
shared living expenses, had open access to each other's condominiums, ate together and shared 
food expenses, kept clothing in the same condominium, used the same furniture and 'otherwise 
lived as though they were husband and wife.'" kL at 917. In the instant case, Uribe and Dalton 
had a sexual relationship, had open access to Uribe's mobile home and Dalton's apartment, 
shared Uribe's cars, and used each other's household items as though they were living together as 
husband and wife. 
Though Uribe testified that Dalton did not contribute to her financial support (Tr. 22), it 
is likely that he benefitted from her support, if indeed he was unemployed as reported by Uribe. 
(Tr. 
9 
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23). Even so, the sharing of the financial obligations surrounding the maintenance of a 
household is not considered to be a requisite element of cohabitation. Haddow. at 673. 
In view of the facts of the present case, it is clear that Ms. Uribe and Brady Dalton had in 
effect resided together. The common residency element of cohabitation has clearly been 
established. It was clearly erroneous for the trial court to award alimony to Ms. Uribe. 
POINT II 
IT WAS IMPROPER FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO AWARD ALIMONY 
RETROACTIVELY TO THE TIME OF SEPARATION AS JURISDICTION 
FOR THE COURT DID NOT COMMENCE UNTIL THE TIME OF FILING OF 
THE PETITION FOR DIVORCE AND TEMPORARY ALIMONY WAS NOT 
REQUESTED BY MS. URIBE. 
Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure clearly establishes that jurisdiction of the 
court begins at the time an action is commenced through the filing of a complaint. This rule 
states: "The court shall have jurisdiction from the time of filing of the complaint or service of 
the summons and a copy of the complaint." Utah R. Civ. P. 3(b). 
In the instant case, the petition for divorce was filed on November 12, 1997. (R. 2). The 
summons and petition were served on November 17, 1997. (R. 5). The parties separated in 
August of 1996. (R. 19). The trial court awarded Ms. Uribe $200 a month from the time of the 
separation in August of 1996. (Tr. 47) (R. 22). Mr. Uribe was ordered to pay back the retroactive 
delinquency at the rate of $ 100 per month. (Tr. 51) (R. 22). 
According to Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the trial court did not have 
jurisdiction over the parties to award alimony prior to November 12, 1997. It was improper for 
10 
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the trial court to award alimony retroactively from the date of separation to the date the petition 
for divorce was filed. 
In Shelton v. Shelton. 885 P.2d 807 (Utah App. 1994), an award of retroactive alimony 
was recognized as a proper exercise of discretion. However, the retroactivity was regarding the 
award of temporary alimony. In Shelton, the husband had deceived the trial court regarding his 
income at the time of the initial hearing which addressed temporary alimony. An award of 
retroactive alimony was awarded to the time the divorce action was filed. WL 
During the pendency of the divorce action, Uribe never requested temporary support and 
maintenance as permitted by Utah Code Annotated 30-3-3(3). According to her financial 
declaration and testimony, her income was greater than her financial needs.2 Uribe established 
no financial need prior to the trial date. It is unclear why the trial court awarded retroactive 
alimony, except that that is what Uribe requested at trial. (Tr. 39). 
It was improper for the trial court to award alimony retroactively. The trial did not have 
jurisdiction to award alimony retroactively to August of 1996, the time of separation. As a 
matter of law, jurisdiction for the court did not commence until the time of the filing of the 
petition for divorce or service of the summons and a copy of the petition. In addition, Ms. Uribe 
did not request separate support and maintenance during the pendency of the action. She 
established no financial need prior to the trial date. 
2This is addressed more fully in Point III of the argument. 
11 
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POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO RECOGNIZE AND CONSIDER THE 
FINANCIAL CONDITIONS, NEEDS, AND ABILITIES OF THE PARTIES 
WHICH ARE ESSENTIAL FACTORS IN DETERMINING WHETHER 
ALIMONY SHOULD BE AWARDED. 
Though a trial court has broad discretion in making an award of alimony, its discretion 
must be exercised within the appropriate legal standards. See Haumont v. Haumont. 793 P.2d 
421, 423 (Utah App. 1990). The decision to award alimony must also be supported with 
adequate findings and conclusions. Naranjo v. Naranjo. 751 P.2d 1144, 1147 (Utah App. 1988). 
As recently pointed out in Childs v. Childs. 353 Utah Adv. Rep. 8, 10 (Utah App. 1998) 
Section 30-3-5(7)(a) of the Utah Code establishes four factors a trial court must consider in 
determining alimony: (1) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; (2) the 
recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; (3) the ability of the payor spouse to 
provide support; and (4) the length of the marriage. Childs at 10; Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-
5(7)(a)(i)-(iv) (Supp. 1998). The trial court may also consider fault in determining alimony. .See 
id §30-3-5(7)(b) (Supp. 1998). 
In the instant case, the trial court only found that there was a disparity of income between 
the parties and a long term marriage. (Tr. 47). Based upon the earnings of the parties as set forth 
in each of their financial declarations, the trial court found that the disparity of income 
necessitated the award of alimony. The court granted Uribe's request of $200 a month alimony. 
(Tr.47)(R. 18). 
Though Ms. Uribe worked 40 hours a week and earned $7.75 (Tr. 18-21) (R. 19), which 
translates to earnings of $310 a week, the trial court found that the better evidence regarding her 
12 
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earnings was the amount set forth in her financial declaration of $835.53 a month. (Tr. 47) (R. 
19). The court stated that even if it accepted the posture that Uribe earned over $1,200 a month, 
it would still justify the $200 a month in alimony. (Tr. 49). 
The trial court failed to consider the financial condition and needs of Ms. Uribe as well as 
her earning capacity. She testified that her monthly financial needs, as reported on her financial 
declaration, were $660 a month. (Tr. 19-20). Even if her earnings were recognized as only 
$835.53 a month, her financial needs would be met. The court, failed to credit her for the 
additional $400 a month earning capacity which she was actually earning. Without an award of 
alimony, Uribe can more than adequately meet her financial needs. An additional $200 a month 
from alimony is simply additional spending money. 
On the other hand, looking at Mr. Ortiz's financial condition, there is little money left 
over after paying his expenses to pay alimony. The trial totally failed to consider Mr. Ortiz's 
ability to provide support. With earnings of $1,960 a month (Tr. 47), Ortiz reported on his 
financial declaration that his expenses were $1,500 a month. What his net income would be, 
would barely meet his monthly expenses. In addition, the trial court found that because of the 
disparity of income, Ortiz should pay the U.S. West telephone obligation in the sum of $1,120. 
(R. 18) (Tr. 46). On top of this, Ortiz was ordered to pay the delinquent retroactive alimony 
accrued during the past seventeen months which totalled $3,400 at the rate of $100 per month. 
By imposing ongoing and retroactive alimony payments upon Ortiz was financially 
overwhelming to him. He clearly had little ability to provide support. 
The trial court failed to recognize and consider essential factors in determining whether 
alimony should be awarded. The parties respective financial conditions, needs, and abilities were 
13 
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not considered. As a matter of law, these factors must be considered. Through a proper analysis 
of the parties abilities and needs, it is apparent that a serious inequity has resulted by awarding 
alimony to Uribe. 
CONCLUSION 
It was improper for the trial court to award alimony to Ms. Uribe in that she cohabitated 
following the separation with Brady Dalton. The two requisite elements of cohabitation have 
been met. Uribe and Dalton undeniably had frequent sexual contact evidencing a conjugal 
association. The common residency element has clearly been established. The facts indicate that 
Uribe and Dalton had in effect resided together. Mr. Ortiz requests that the appellate court 
reverse the trial court's order awarding alimony on the basis that Uribe cohabitated following the 
separation of the parties. 
As a matter of law, the trial court did not have jurisdiction to award alimony retroactively 
from the time the petition for divorce was filed to the time of the parties separation. Jurisdiction 
commenced once the petition for divorce was filed. It was also improper for the trial court to 
award alimony retroactively from the date of trial to the time that the petition for divorce was 
filed. Ms. Uribe did not establish a need nor did she request temporary alimony pending the 
divorce action. If the award of alimony is affirmed, the order for retroactive alimony should be 
reversed. 
The trial court failed to consider the parties financial conditions, needs, and abilities in 
determining the award of alimony. As a matter of law, these factors must be considered. It was 
improper for the trial court to base alimony on the disparity of the parties income. A close 
14 
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evaluation of the parties financial conditions, needs, and abilities, shows that there is little 
disparity of income. Mr. Ortiz respectfully requests that the award of alimony be reversed on the 
basis that the trial court failed to properly consider the parties financial conditions, needs, and 
abilities, and there was little disparity of income to award alimony. At a minimum, the matter 
should be remanded for the trial court to consider the required factors in awarding alimony. 
4k> 
DATED THIS ID day of November, 1998. 
Hv 
ROBERT L. MOODY 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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9 HUSBAND AND WIFE 30-3-3 
Section 
30-3-11.1. 
30-3-11.2. 
30-3-11.3. 
30-3-12. 
30-3-13. 
30-3-13.1. 
30-3-14. 
30-3-14.1. 
30-3-15. 
30-3-15.1. 
30-3-15.2. 
30-3-15.3. 
30-3-15.4. 
30-3-16. 
30-3-16.1. 
30-3-16.2. 
30-3-16.3. 
30-3-16.4. 
30-3-16.5. 
30-3-16.6. 
30-3-16.7. 
30-3-17. 
30-3-17.1. 
30-3-18. 
30-3-19 to 30 
30-3-32. 
30-3-33. 
30-3-34. 
30-3-35. 
30-3-35.5. 
30-3-36. 
30-3-37. 
30-3-38. 
Family Court Act — Purpose. 
Appointment of counsel for child. 
Mandatory educational course for divorcing 
parents — Purpose — Curriculum — Excep-
tions. 
Courts to exercise family counseling powers. 
Repealed. 
Establishment of family court division of dis-
trict court. 
Repealed. 
Designation of judges — Terms. 
Repealed. 
Appointment of domestic relations counselors, 
family court commissioner, and assistants 
and clerks. 
Repealed. 
Commissioners — Powers. 
Salaries and expenses. 
Repealed. 
Jurisdiction of family court division — Powers. 
Petition for conciliation. 
Contents of petition. 
Procedure upon filing of petition. 
Fees. 
Information not available to public. 
Effect of petition — Pendency of action. 
Power and jurisdiction of judge. 
Proceedings deemed confidential — Written 
evaluation by counselor. 
Waiting period for hearing after filing for di-
vorce — Exemption — Use of counseling and 
education services not to be construed as 
condonation or promotion. 
•3-31. Repealed. 
Visitation — Intent — Policy — Definitions. 
Advisory guidelines. 
Best interests — Rebuttable presumption. 
Minimum schedule for visitation for children 5 
to 18 years of age. 
Minimum schedule for visitation for children 
under five years of age. 
Special circumstances. 
Relocation. 
Pilot Program for Expedited Visitation En-
forcement. 
30-3-1. Procedure — Res idence — Grounds. 
(1) Proceedings in divorce are commenced and conducted as 
provided by law for proceedings in civil causes, except as 
provided in this chapter. 
(2) The court may decree a dissolution of the marriage 
contract between the petitioner and respondent on the 
grounds specified in Subsection (3) in all cases where the 
petitioner or respondent has been an actual and bona fide 
resident of this state and of the county where the action is 
brought, or if members of the armed forces of the United 
States who are not legal residents of this state, where the 
petitioner has been stationed in this state under military 
orders, for three months next prior to the commencement of 
the action. 
(3) Grounds for divorce: 
(a) impotency of the respondent at the time of mar-
riage; 
(b) adultery committed by the respondent subsequent 
to marriage; 
(c) willful desertion of the petitioner by the respondent 
for more than one year; 
(d) willful neglect of the respondent to provide for the 
petitioner the common necessaries of life; 
(e> habitual drunkenness of the respondent; 
(f) conviction of the respondent for a felony; 
(g) cruel t reatment of the petitioner by the respondent 
to the extent of causing bodily injury or great mental 
distress to the petitioner; 
(h) irreconcilable differences of the marriage; 
(i) incurable insanity; or 
(j) when the husband and wife have lived separately 
under a decree of separate maintenance of any state for 
three consecutive years without cohabitation. 
(4) A decree of divorce granted under Subsection (3)(j) does 
not affect the liability of either party under any provision for 
separate maintenance previously granted. 
(5) (a) A divorce may not be granted on the grounds of 
insanity unless: 
(i) the respondent has been adjudged insane by the 
appropriate authorities of this or another state prior 
to the commencement of the action; and 
(ii) the court finds by the testimony of competent 
witnesses that the insanity of the respondent is 
incurable. 
(b) The court shall appoint for the respondent a guard-
ian ad litem who shall protect the interests of the respon-
dent. A copy of the summons and complaint shall be 
served on the respondent in person or by publication, as 
provided by the laws of this state in other actions for 
divorce, or upon his guardian ad litem, and upon the 
county attorney for the county where the action is pros-
ecuted. 
(c) The county attorney shall investigate the merits of 
the case and if the respondent resides out of this state, 
take depositions as necessary, attend the proceedings, and 
make a defense as is just to protect the rights of the 
respondent and the interests of the state. 
(d) In all actions the court and judge have jurisdiction 
over the payment of alimony, the distribution of property, 
and the custody and maintenance of minor children, as 
the courts and judges possess in other actions for divorce. 
(e) The petitioner or respondent may, if the respondent 
resides in this state, upon notice, have the respondent 
brought into the court at trial, or have an examination of 
th£ respondent by two or more competent physicians, to 
determine the mental condition of the respondent. For 
this purpose either party may have leave from the court to 
enter any asylum or institution where the respondent 
may be confined. The costs of court in this action shall be 
apportioned by the court. 1997 
30-3-2. Right of husband to divorce. 
The husband may in all cases obtain a divorce from his wife 
for the same causes and in the same manner as the wife may 
obtain a divorce from her husband. 1953 
30-3-3. Award of costs , attorney and wi tness fees — 
Temporary alimony. 
(1) In any action filed under Title 30, Chapter 3, 4, or 6, and 
in any action to establish an order of custody, visitation, child 
support, alimony, or division of property in a domestic case, 
the court may order a party to pay the costs, attorney fees, and 
witness fees, including expert witness fees, of the other party 
to enable the other party to prosecute or defend the action. The 
order may include provision for costs of the action. 
(2) In any action to enforce an order of custody, visitation, 
child support, alimony, or division of property in a domestic 
case, the court may award costs and attorney fees upon 
determining that the party substantially prevailed upon the 
claim or defense. The court, in its discretion, may award no 
fees or limited fees against a party if the court finds the party 
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is impecunious or enters in the record the reason for not 
awarding fees. 
(3) In any action listed in Subsection (1), the court may 
order a party to provide money, during the pendency of the 
action, for the separate support and maintenance of the other 
party and of any children in the custody of the other party. 
(4) Orders entered under this section prior to entry of the 
final order or judgment may be amended during the course of 
the action or in the final order or judgment. 1993 
30-3-4. Pleadings — Findings — Decree — Use of affi-
davit — Sealing. 
(1) (a) The complaint shall be in writing and signed by the 
petitioner or petitioner's attorney. 
(b) A decree of divorce may not be granted upon default 
or otherwise except upon legal evidence taken in the 
cause. If the decree is to be entered upon the default of the 
respondent, evidence to support the decree may be sub-
mitted upon the affidavit of the petitioner with the ap-
proval of the court. 
(c) If the petitioner and the respondent have a child or 
children, a decree of divorce may not be granted until both 
parties have attended the mandatory course described in 
Section 30-3-11.3, and have presented a certificate of 
course completion to the court. The court may waive this 
requirement, on its own motion or on the motion of one of 
the parties, if it determines course attendance and 
completion are not necessary, appropriate, feasible, or in 
the best interest of the parties. 
(d) All hearings and trials for divorce shall be held 
before the court or the court commissioner as provided by 
Section 78-3-31 and rules of the Judicial Council. The 
court or the commissioner in all divorce cases shall enter 
the decree upon the evidence or, in the case of a decree 
after default of the respondent, upon the petitioner's 
affidavit. 
(2) The file, except the decree of divorce, may be sealed by 
order of the court upon the motion of either party. The sealed 
portion of the file is available to the public only upon an order 
of the court. The concerned parties, the attorneys of record or 
attorney filing a notice of appearance in the action, the Office 
of Recovery Services if a party to the proceedings has applied 
for or is receiving public assistance, or the court have full 
access to the entire record. This sealing does not apply to 
subsequent filings to enforce or amend the decree. 1997 
30-3-4.1 to 30-3-4.4. Repealed. 1990 
30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance and 
health care of parties and children — Divi-
sion of debts — Court to have continuing 
jurisdiction — Custody and visitation — De-
termination of alimony — Nonmeritorious pe-
tition for modification. 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may 
include in it equitable orders relating to the children, property, 
debts or obligations, and parties. The court shall include the 
following in every decree of divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of 
reasonable and necessary medical and dental expenses of 
the dependent children; 
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable 
cost, an order requiring the purchase and maintenance of 
appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance 
for the dependent children; 
.. (c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5: 
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible 
for the payment of joint debts, obligations, or liabili-
ties of the parties contracted or incurred during 
marriage; 
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respec-
tive creditors or obligees, regarding the court's divi-
sion of debts, obligations, or liabilities and regarding 
the parties' separate, current addresses; and 
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders; 
and 
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance 
with Title 62A, Chapter 11, Recovery Services. 
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child 
support, an order assigning financial responsibility for all or a 
portion of child care expenses incurred on behalf of the 
dependent children, necessitated by the employment or train-
ing of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the 
circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent chil-
dren would be adequately cared for, it may include an order 
allowing the noncustodial parent to provide child care for the 
dependent children, necessitated by the employment or train-
ing of the custodial parent. 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subse-
quent changes or new orders for the custody of the children 
and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, and 
for distribution of the property and obligations for debts as is 
reasonable and necessary. 
(4) (a) In determining visitation rights of parents, grand-
parents, and other members of the immediate family, the 
court shall consider the best interest of the child. 
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for 
peace officer enforcement, the court may include in an 
order establishing a visitation schedule a provision, 
among other things, authorizing any peace officer to 
enforce a court ordered visitation schedule entered under 
this chapter. 
(5) If a petition for modification of child custody or visita-
tion provisions of a court order is made and denied, the court 
shall order the petitioner to pay the reasonable attorneys' fees 
expended by the prevailing party in that action, if the court 
determines that the petition was without merit and not 
asserted or defended against in good faith. 
(6) If a petition alleges substantial noncompliance with a 
visitation order by a parent, a grandparent, or other member 
of the immediate family pursuant to Section 78-32-12.2 where 
a visitation right has been previously granted by the court, the 
court may award to the prevailing party costs, including 
actual attorney fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing 
party because of the other party's failure to provide or exercise 
court-ordered visitation. 
(7) (a) The court shall consider at least the following fac-
tors in determining alimony: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipi-
ent spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to 
produce income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide 
support; and 
(iv) the length of the marriage. 
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in 
determining alimony. 
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the 
standard of living, existing at the time of separation, in 
determining alimony in accordance with Subsection (a). 
However, the court shall consider all relevant facts and 
equitable principles and may, in its discretion, base ali-
mony on the standard of living that existed at the time of 
trial. In marriages of short duration, when no children 
have been conceived or born during the marriage, the 
court may consider the standard of living that existed at 
the time of the marriage. 
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, 
attempt to equalize the parties' respective standards of 
living. 
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(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the 
threshold of a major change in the income of one of the 
spouses due to the collective efforts of both, that change 
shall be considered in dividing the marital property and 
in determining the amount of alimony. If one spouse's 
earning capacity has been greatly enhanced through the 
efforts of both spouses during the marriage, the court may 
make a compensating adjustment in dividing the marital 
property and awarding alimony. 
(f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short 
duration dissolves, and no children have been conceived 
or born during the marriage, the court may consider 
restoring each party to the condition which existed at the 
time of the marriage. 
(g) (i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make 
substantive changes and new orders regarding ali-
mony based on a substantial material change in 
circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the 
divorce. 
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a 
new order for alimony to address needs of the recipi-
ent that did not exist at the time the decree was 
entered, unless the court finds extenuating circum-
stances that justify that action. 
(iii) In determining alimony, the income of any 
subsequent spouse of the payor may not be consid-
ered, except as provided in this subsection. 
(A) The court may consider the subsequent 
spouse's financial ability to share living ex-
penses. 
(B) The court may consider the income of a 
subsequent spouse if the court finds that the 
payor's improper conduct justifies that consider-
ation. 
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer 
than the number of years that the marriage existed 
unless, at any time prior to termination of alimony, the 
court finds extenuating circumstances that justify the 
payment of alimony for a longer period of time. 
(8) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides other-
wise, any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a 
former spouse automatically terminates upon the remarriage 
of that former spouse. However, if the remarriage is annulled 
and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall 
resume if the party paying alimony is made a party to the 
action of annulment and his rights are determined. 
(9) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a 
former spouse terminates upon establishment by the party 
paying alimony that the former spouse is cohabitating with 
another person. 1997 
30-3-5.1. Provision for income withholding in child 
support order. 
Whenever a court enters an order for child support, it shall 
include in the order a provision for withholding income as a 
means of collecting child support as provided in Title 62A, 
Chapter 11, Recovery Services. 1997 
30-3-5.2. Allegations of child abuse or child sexual 
abuse — Investigation. 
When, in any divorce proceeding or upon a request for 
modification of a divorce decree, an allegation of child abuse or 
child sexual abuse is made, implicating either party, the court 
shall order that an investigation be conducted by the Division 
of Child and Family Services within the Department of 
Human Services in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 4a. A 
final award of custody or visitation may not be rendered until 
a report on that investigation is received by the court. That 
investigation shall be conducted by the Division of Child and 
Family Services within 30 days of the court's notice and 
request for an investigation. In reviewing this report, the 
court shall comply with Section 78-7-9. 1996 
30-3-5.5, 30-3-6. Repealed. 1991,1993 
30-3-7. When decree becomes absolute. 
(1) The decree of divorce becomes absolute: 
(a) on the date it is signed by the court and entered by 
the clerk in the register of actions if both the parties who 
have a child or children have completed attendance at the 
mandatory course for divorcing parents as provided in 
Section 30-3-11.3 except if the court waives the require-
ment, on its own motion or on the motion of one of the 
parties, upon determination that course attendance and 
completion are not necessary, appropriate, feasible, or in 
the best interest of the parties; 
(b) at the expiration of a period of time the court may 
specifically designate, unless an appeal or other proceed-
ings for review are pending; or 
(c) when the court, before the decree becomes absolute, 
for sufficient cause otherwise orders. 
(2) The court, upon application or on its own motion for 
good cause shown, may waive, alter, or extend a designated 
period of time before the decree becomes absolute, but not to 
exceed six months from the signing and entry of the decree. 
1994 
30-3-8. Remarriage — When unlawful. 
Neither party to a divorce proceeding which dissolves their 
marriage by decree may marry any person other than the 
spouse from whom the divorce was granted until it becomes 
absolute. If an appeal is taken, the divorce is not absolute until 
after affirmance of the decree. 1988 
30-3-9. Repealed. 1969 
30-3-10. Custody of children in case of separation or 
divorce — Custody consideration. 
(1) If a husband and wife having minor children are sepa-
rated, or their marriage is declared void or dissolved, the court 
shall make an order for the future care and custody of the 
minor children as it considers appropriate. In determining 
custody, the court shall consider the best interests of the child 
and the past conduct and demonstrated moral standards of 
each of the parties. The court may inquire of the children and 
take into consideration the children's desires regarding the 
future custody, but the expressed desires are not controlling 
and the court may determine the children's custody otherwise. 
(2) In awarding custody, the court shall consider, among 
other factors the court finds relevant, which parent is most 
likely to act in the best interests of the child, including 
allowing the child frequent and continuing contact with the 
noncustodial parent as the court finds appropriate. 
(3) If the court finds that one parent does not desire custody 
of the child, or has attempted to permanently relinquish 
custody to a third party, it shall take that evidence into 
consideration in determining whether to award custody to the 
other parent. 
(4) (a) A court may not discriminate against a parent due 
to a disability, as defined in Section 57-21-2, in awarding 
custody or determining whether a substantial change has 
occurred for the purpose of modifying an award of custody. 
(b) If a court takes a parent's disability into account in 
awarding custody or determining whether a substantial 
change has occurred for the purpose of modifying an 
award of custody, the parent with a disability may rebut 
any evidence, presumption, or inference arising therefrom 
by showing that: 
(i) the disability does not significantly or substan-
tially inhibit the parent's ability to provide for the 
physical and emotional needs of the child at issue; or 
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Robert L. Moody, No. 2302 
MOODY & BROWN 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
2525 North Canyon Road 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: (801) 373-2721 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOSE RAFAEL ORTIZ-URIBE, : DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Petitioner, 
v. : 
LAURIE ORTIZ-URIBE, : Civil No. 974402506 
Judge Ray M. Harding, Jr. 
Respondent. : 
The above entitled matter having come on regularly for trial on the 17th day of 
March, 1998, and the Petitioner having presented evidence and the Respondent having presented 
evidence and the court having considered the same and having made in writing its Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
NOW HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES AS FOLLOWS: 
1. Petitioner is hereby awarded a Decree of Divorce from the Respondent, the 
same to become final upon the signing and entry in the Registry of Actions. 
u 
i i ; x , ' I 
mc?¥yf*jm^iJ&!JzZ. 
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2. Each of the parties are hereby awarded the personalty now in their respective 
possessions as a full and complete property settlement. 
3. Petitioner is ordered to pay to the Respondent alimony in the sum of $200.00 
per month retroactive to August of 1996 and continuing from said date until the Respondent's 
remarriage, co-habitation or for five years, whichever occurs first. 
4. Petitioner is ordered to pay the delinquent support which has accrued pursuant 
to the Findings of Fact made by this court in the sum of $100.00 per month. Petitioner is 
ordered to pay said $100.00 together with $200.00 per month alimony commencing on the 25th 
day of March, 1998, and continuing on the 10th and 25th of each month thereafter until 
Respondent's remarriage, cohabitation or the expiration of five years from August 1996, 
whichever occurs first. 
5. Petitioner is ordered to pay the judgment against the Respondent with Knight 
Adjustment Bureau and to hold Respondent harmless from liability thereon. 
6. Respondent's maiden name, Paskett, is hereby restored. 
DATED this / V ' c f a y of March, 1998. 9 § ^ W £ > ^ ' * 
B>^HE COURT: ffl f'^mSv^ 
\>> 
I* 
v ^ 
\Y M. WARDING, JR. % ^ ' £ ^ 
Judge • « r*zsss 7/t. 
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NOTICE TO RESPONDENT 
TO: Laurie Ortiz-Uribe 
441 South State, #16 
Orem, Utah 84058 
YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned, Attorney for 
Petitioner, will submit the above and foregoing Decree of Divorce to the Honorable Ray M. 
Harding, Jr., for his signature, upon the expiration of five (5) days from the date of this Notice, 
plus three (3) days for mailing, unless written objection is filed prior to that time, pursuant to 
Rule 4-504 of the Rules of Judicial Administration. Kindly govern yourself accordingly. 
DATED this \& day of March, 1998. 
ROBERT L. MOODY 
Attorney for Petitioner 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
m ;•:::; i' n 
Robert L. Moody, No. 2302 
MOODY & BROWN 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
2525 North Canyon Road 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: (801) 373-2721 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOSE RAFAEL ORTIZ-URIBE, : FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Petitioner, : 
v. : 
LAURIE ORTIZ-URIBE, : Civil No. 974402506 
Judge Ray M. Harding, Jr. 
Respondent. : 
The above entitled matter having come on regularly for trial on the 17th day of 
March, 1998, and Petitioner being present and being represented by counsel, Robert L. Moody, 
and Respondent being present pro se and the court having heard the Stipulation of the parties 
and evidence with regard to alimony and the debt owing to U.S. West and being fully advised 
in the premises: 
NOW ENTERS THE FOLLOWING: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The court finds that the parties first married on the 24th day of December, 
1984, that marriage was annulled due to the incapacity of the Respondent to marry the 
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Petitioner, and they were remarried in November of 1995, and since that time have been, and 
now are, husband and wife. 
2. The court finds that the parties have been residents of Utah County, State of 
Utah, for more than three months prior to the filing of this action. 
3. The court finds that the parties have developed irreconcilable differences 
making the continuation of the marriage impossible. 
4. The court finds that no children have been born as issue to the marriage and 
none are expected. 
5. The court finds that the parties have divided the personal property and each 
should be awarded the personalty now in their respective possession as a full and complete 
property settlement. 
6. The court finds that Petitioner is employed by Capital Roofing and in 1997 
earned $19,060 gross. The court further finds that Respondent is employed by a nursing home 
and earns $7.75 per hour and works 40 hours a week. The court finds that the better evidence 
with regard to Respondent's earnings is the amount set forth in the financial declaration 
submitted by Respondent to the clerk in the sum of $800.00 per month. 
7. The court finds that Petitioner's and Respondent's needs are as set forth in 
their respective Financial Declarations. 
8. The court finds that Respondent has not co-habited since the separation. 
9. The court finds that the parties separated in August of 1996. 
2 
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10. The court finds that because of the disparity of income of the parties that 
Petitioner should pay to the Respondent as alimony the sum of $200.00 per month retroactive 
to August of 1996 and continuing until Respondent's remarriage or co-habitation or until the 
expiration of five years, whichever occurs first. 
11. The court finds that Petitioner should pay to Respondent delinquent support 
that has accrued during the past seventeen months or $3,400.00 at the rate of $100.00 per 
month. The delinquent support and continuing alimony of $200.00 a month shall commence on 
the 25th day of March, 1998, and shall be payable on the 10th and 25th of each month thereafter 
until the further order of the court or the expiration of the five years or remarriage or 
cohabitation, whichever occurs first. 
12. The court finds that because of the disparity of income that Petitioner should 
pay the judgment against the Respondent in favor of Knight Adjustment Bureau representing the 
U.S. West telephone obligation in the sum of $1,120 and Petitioner should hold Respondent 
harmless from said debt. 
The court having made in writing its Findings of Fact, 
NOW ENTERS THE FOLLOWING: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The court concludes that Petitioner is entitled to a decree of divorce from the 
Respondent. 
2. The court concludes that Respondent has not cohabited. 
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3. Fhe coun c includes that Pennonei should pav alimom ictroacme to August 
of 1996 in the amount and
 4;i : . limes as set - . i,. ' • \ t. 
4. Fhe court concludes thai PiMinoner shnnu njv ::ic den- ,A\ n< .«• " ight 
Adjustment representing a collection matter i-J - ^ • - *!'* • i ..* nu • 
liiil'uhu thereon 
/ / 
DATED this ..^ / Jay oi Manh, 1W,S. 
. B r T H l CO! RT: 
Jud«< 
NOTICE TO RESPONDENT 
TO: Laurie Ortiz-Uribe 
441 South State, #16 
Orem, Utah 84058 
Mill WIN I'lLASh IAKI Nnl 1<'!• Ihal Ihr iindusnuR-d Aii.imn lm IVli-
tioner, will submit the above and foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to the 
Honnrahic i..« :auiii!.u. • •"• '' ' ' ' e 
date ol tins NOIKV piu^ - three >?>) da\s to; -'..iiling. unless written ohteciion i^  nieu prior n> that 
time, pursuant ..... * -•• nn loin HI iuuniij Viiiiinr nation Kmdh in rin sourself 
accordingly. 
DAI 1.1) (hi>, 1 ^ dav ol Miiidi IWN 
ROBLRTI M001j)Y 
Attorno. i'. * Petitioner 
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46 
cohabits one doesn't get alimony. 
THE COURT: In this matter I am going to 
grant the petitioner a divorce on the basis of 
irreconcilable differences, and I will require each 
party to pay their own debts and obligations, with the 
exception of the telephone bill owed to United 
Adjustment Bureau, which has been reduced to a 
judgment lien in the amount of $1122, which the 
petitioner shall assume and pay and hold the defendant 
harmless there from. I'm going to require that he 
make that full payment within 60 days from today's 
date. 
MR. MOODY: Can he make a satisfactory 
arrangement with them rather than 60 days? 
THE COURT: Yes, he can satisfy that 
directly with them within 6 0 days -- I see what you're 
suggesting. 
MR. MOODY: If he contacted them and they 
agreed to take a monthly payment. 
THE COURT: Any objection to that? 
MS. ORTIZ: No, I don't have any objection 
to that, but I would like (inaudible) if I was going 
to be granted a divorce, maybe I can go back to using 
my name, Paskett. 
THE COURT: Any objection to that request? 
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MP MOCTv- N y •.- H ncr' ( m a u d : l e ) 
T -:- - -.. 11. -: .- b e 
r e t u r n e e t: : he r n.aiden nanu .v ' i s ? 
M S , 0 RT T Z P =! s k e *~' " -i ~ - v - - -
THE COURT; "J ; sat i siry 
that -- he'll just, hold her narmiess irom :n.o 
obi igat J i HI „ then ind sat> * --i Adjustment Bureau 
* * nose payments. 
As r- * r-~ rrusehc.n : -mi Lure furnishings 
• hi cles , • ' ~ - .:r 
j u r i e n t l y have in m e ; r p o s s e s s i o n . 
As * •" ' ne -i 1 " ""on* issu<~- " ,ir f : r : *;: . 
,- i •_ i . i r s p a r i r . - • * <•- • • ^ 
.: i ,: . .. - * * •* ; a r r i a g e , and b a s e d upon *. : e a r n i n g s 
^ c \ a "at i on $1°^ ^ a raoiiim, 
: : nei -MMxaj^s ab ScrL : : : .. .*. ;.ui : -...i.. 
i^~" a r a t i on of $83 5 53 m ' : ~:c : m; : ' • 
m a t t e r . 
I'll award the defendant the alimony she's 
requesting o;t $^Uu d niouUi I i ui Mi*. time I. IUJI. hr left" 
in August of 1996 until such time as she remarries or 
r.ohribl trates or f i VP years, whichever occurs first i 
will specifically find that the incidents regaidiny 
the males to this point have not constituted 
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48 
1 cohabitation. 
2 I'll require each party to bear their own 
3 costs and attorneys fees in this action. Are there 
4 any other items that we need an order on, Mr. Moody? 
5 MR. MOODY: Well, let me (inaudible) if I 
6 may clarify. 
7 THE COURT: Yes. 
8 MR. MOODY: I would suggest that alimony --
9 she didn't come in for temporary alimony, we don't go 
10 backwards to 1996. 
11 THE COURT: I'll allow you to speak to that. 
12 MR. MOODY: If the Court wants to award her 
13 five years alimony, I certainly think that's 
14 (inaudible) discretion of the Court, but to impose 
15 upon him alimony backwards -- I mean how we have a 
16 lump sum -- if he obviously can't pay, he can't pay 
17 the telephone bill. If the Court wants to order him 
18 to pay five years alimony, it should begin in the 
19 month of March or April of 1998 and go for five years. 
20 THE COURT: Why do you believe that, Mr. 
21 Moody? 
22 MR. MOODY: Well, because she didn't come in 
23 and get a temporary order to penalize him to reduce it 
24 to a judgment back to August of 1996 to the present 
25 time. That just penalizes him and it makes him 
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^v^T. "*?nr Honor, T didn't: know that I 
vas supposes . . ; ^ r a,.yir^::g with tiie Cou i I I 
didn't know what did you call it, I needed • > 
MR MOODY: A temporary order.. 
ORTIZ temporary order, I don't, know 
\A ' . . . i i i i" I "I 1 ed i HI,Mr i I in-1 
financial declaration, an? this has kind of all been a 
I :;:i-....r , rocess for me I put on. the back of 
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it that that's what I had asked for. That was the 
first time I knew that I was to do anything except for 
ask for the stipulations and the (inaudible) sent to 
you. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Mr. Moody, I'm going to base it on the $835 
she shows in her financial declaration. I'll also 
find, however, that in the event she were making the 
$12 0 0 a month which you referred to, that it would 
still justify the amount of $200 a month. 
I am going to require the alimony payment 
from August of 1996. I will, however, provide that he 
can pay the delinquency that has accrued to the 
current date at the rate of -- what would be a 
satisfactory amount to you, ma'am? 
MS. ORTIZ: I'm not sure (inaudible). 
THE COURT: I'm going to allow him to pay 
the amount that's accrued thus far to this date in 
payments to you. 
MS. ORTIZ: That's fine. 
THE COURT: Is there an amount of payment 
that would be acceptable to you? 
MS. ORTIZ: I don't know, is it by monthly, 
is it--
THE COURT: I'm going to require it monthly. 
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m o n t h s , 
MS 
y o u ki 
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d e l i n q u e n c y 
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,-^c 
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hi I! 1 
amount - -
Wei 1, 
( i n a u d i b,] e) 
•JET 'A'l . 
f-IIl . . i l l 
o n g o i n g of $2 0 0 a. 
w a r d s 1: 
h e
 C o u l d j u s t a d d l i k e 
* 
« : : . *u t h a t d e l i n q u e n c y 
i 
t o 
- ... '- - * *'
 4ei month, and the first 
payment ^ug^i^y ana Jt. ..quency snail be paid 
w,i thin * v^ days fmir t .->ria\ - iate In other words, 
let : s '- -
--.:. r u r t h e r quesr ions u i s s u e s that, e i t h e r 
p a r t y w:v; -'" iL--- * "a-,—_- * ' "*~ "^urt? 
conc lus ion and c^cree c o n s i s t e n t * • ;: r hat rder-
"T •• t re a judgment for 
delinquency? 
THE COURT: No, I've allowed h:rr * -. -v - :>~-
r'.rst payment due w:in ; ;.e rirsr. a-imony pa\7ne:*; -.:* 
f ;^-=» ^ a^ '= So he's going to be paying $3 0 0 a month 
-•- ts the delinquency pa i d • ai id t::l len :i t M „ i 1! 1 
drop ccwn *o the $200 a month until she™-
FJR MOODY i it wi.1.1 run tor five years from,, 
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August of 1995? 
THE COURT: August of 1996. 
MR. MOODY: Excuse me, August of 1996. 
THE COURT: Five years or until she 
remarries or cohabitates, whichever occurs first, and 
as I've indicated so there's no issue, I've found that 
the incidences occurring to this date do not 
constitute cohabitation. 
MS. ORTIZ: That's what I wanted to make 
sure that I know for sure what you mean by 
cohabitating, moving in together; is that correct? 
THE COURT: That's correct, residing 
together as man and wife. 
MS. ORTIZ: Okay. 
MR. MOODY: Thank you, your Honor. 
MS. ORTIZ: Thank you, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
(Hearing concluded) 
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Robert i MO<H:: NO. 2302 
MOODY & BROWN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2525 North Canyon Road 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: (801) 373-2721 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT ('<•: R! >t- UIAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOSE RAFAEL ORTIZ-URIBE, FINANCIAL DECLARATK >N 
Plaintiff. 
LAURIE ORTIZ-URIBE Civil No. 974402506 
Defendant Dated 3/5/98 
Husband: Jose Rafael Ortiz-Uribe 
Address: 250 West Center Street 
PI. Grove. UT 84062 
Soc. Sec. No.: 
Occupation: Roofer 
Employer: Capital Roofing 
Birthdate: 8-24-63 
Wife: Laurie Ortiz-Un be 
Address; 
Soc. Sec. No 
Occupation. 
Employer: 
Birthdate-
441 S. 
Orem. 
State. t#16 
UT 84057 
NOTE: This Declaration must be riled with the Domestic Calendar Clerk. 5 days prior to the Pre-Tnai Hearing. Failure by either 
party to complete, present, and tile this form as required will authorize the Court to accept the statement ot the other 
party as the basis tor its decision, 
Any false statement 
the Court. 
it ai id may be considered a fraud upon 
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STATEMENT OF INCOME, EXPENSES, ASSETS, AND LIABILITIES 
(Note: To arrive at monthly figures when income is received and deductions are made weekly, multiply by 4.3; 
if figures are on a bi-weekly basis, multiply by 2.167) 
Gross monthly income from: 
Salary and wages, including commissions, bonuses, allowances and 
overtime, payable (pay period) 
Pensions and retirement 
Social security 
Disability and unemployment insurance 
Public assistance (welfare, A F D C payment, etc.) 
Child support from any prior marriage 
Dividends and interest 
Rents 
Al l other sources: (Specify) - Alimony $250, Medical Insurance 
pursuant to Decree $63 
TOTAL MONTHLY INCOME 
HUSBAND 
$1960.00 
$1960.00 
WIFE 1 
Itemize monthly deductions from gross income: 
State and federal income taxes 
Number of exemptions taken 
Social security 
Medical or other insurance (describe fully) 
Union or other dues 
Retirement or pension fund 
Savings plan 
Credit union 
Other: (specify) 
| TOTAL MONTHLY DEDUCTIONS $ 
*« '* | 
i 
$ 1 
1 NET MONTHLY INCOME—TAKE HOME PAY $1500.00 
DEBTS AND OBLIGATIONS 
Creditor *s Name For Date Payable 
TOTAL DEBTS AND OBLIGATIONS 
Balance Monthly Payment 
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0. A L L PROPERTY OF THE PARTIES KNOWN 1 0 ME 
Owned individually or jointly (indicate who holds or how title held (H) Husband. (W) Wife, (J) Jointly). 
(a) 
(b) 
(e) 
Household furnishings, furniture, appliances, and equipment 
A111 o m o b i 1 e f Ye ar- M a ke) 
i 
1
 Securities—Stocks. Bonds 
s 
!' ' "ash and Deposit Accounts (banks, savings and loans, credit unions— 
L;ie Insurance 
i \.'ompan\ Name Policy No face Amount 
1 
Profit Sharing or Retire 
Name 
ment Accounts 
il Name 
VALUE OWED THERE-
ON 
savings and checking) 
— • — - • - - — 
Cash value, accumulated 
Jividend. or loan amount 
- —- - — 1 
Value ot interest and amount presently 
ig) Real Estate (Where more than one parcel of real estate owned, attach sheet with identical information for all additional 
property) 
Address: 
Original Cost $__ 
Cost of Additions $_ 
Total Cost $ " 
1 ype of Property 
Date of Acquisition 
Total Present Value $_ 
Basis of Valuation 
Mortgage Balance $__ 
Other Liens S_ , 
Equity $ _ 
Monthly Amortization S_ 
Taxes $ And to whom 
Individual contributions $ 
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(h) Business Interest (indicate name, share, type of business value less indebtedness) 
(i) Other assets (Specify) 
6.TOTAL MONTHLY EXPENSES 
Specify which party is the custodial parent and list name and relationship of all members of the household whose 
expenses are included: 
Rent or mortgage payments (residence) 
Real property taxes (residence) 
Real property insurance (residence) 
I Maintenance (residence) 
Food and household supplies 
Utilities including water, electricity', gas. and heat 
Telephone 
Laundry and cleaning 
Clothing 
Medical 
[| Dental 
Insurance (life, accident, comprehensive liability, disability) 
Exclude payroll deducted - Health Insurance 
Child Care 
Payment of child spousal support re: prior marriage 
II School 
Entertainment (includes clubs, social obligations, travel, and recre-
ation) 
Incidentals (grooming, tobacco, alcohol, gifts, and donations) - Misc. 
Transportation (other than automobile) 
Auto expense (gas. oil. repair, insurance) 
Installment payment(s). (Insert total and attach itemized schedule if 
|| not fully set forth in (d) on the first page hereof) 
Other expenses (Insert total and specify on attached schedule) -
|| Credit Card and Charge Accounts 
TOTAL EXPENSES 
HUSBAND 
$250.00 
450.00 
100.00 
50.00 
50.00 
50.00 
100.00 
350.00 
$ 
SI 400.00 
WIFE 1 
• ' 
•, • 
i 11 
' 
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SIGNED on the date written above. 
ROBERT L. M O e r v JOSE RAFAEI ORTIZ-URIBE 
Attorney for Plaiiu.ii 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
FINANCIAL DECLARATION 
Plaintiff 
vs. Civil No. 
IduztO lyti O&iz. iJeJRtr 
' Defendant 
Husband: Wife: hui&i^ L^N t)tt^Utojij? 
Address: Address: 4 f l ^> A ^ <sfedtf ^ **Hlb 
Soc. Sec. No 
Occupation:__ 
Employer 
Jldr Qtem
 3 Wt ftffSff 
Birthdate: Birthdate:'1 r^b > SPj l^k3 
NOTE: This declaration must be filed with the domestic calendar clerk 5 days 
prior to the pre-trial hearing. Failure by either party to complete, 
present, and file this form as required will authorize the Court to accept 
the statement of the other party as the basis for its decision. Any false 
statement made hereon shall subject you to the penalty for perjury and may be 
considered a fraud upon the Court. 
STATEMENT OF INCOME, EXPENSES, ASSETS AND LIABILITIES: 
Note: To arrive at monthly figures when income is 
received and deductions are made weekly, multiply 
4.3; if figures are on a bi-weekly basis, multiply 
by 2.167. Husband Wife 
1. Gross monthly income from: 
Salary and wages, including commissions, 
bonuses, allowances and overtime. CX^tr* r Z> 
Payable: _
 r, Pay Period: A t , . . i cyoSr Q-o 
Pensions and retirement r&ujBeLL ^ £*£ptS 
Social Security 
Disability and unemployment insurance 
Public assistance (welfare, AFDC payments 
etc. 
Child support from any prior marriage 
Dividends and interest 
All other sources (specify) 
TOTAL MONTHLY INCOME _____ $5£T<S~3> 
V^flr^ s on each pog^u-
I 
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Wife 
itemize mcntmy deductions LVY ir:;sr income: 
State and f- ieral income taxes 13 J ,33 
Number of exempt - ^ ^ 4 ^ V-^n _ _ _ _ _ ~~&~~„ 
Social Security _____ ._ j 1 * P)Q 
Medical or other insurance tdescnii . ) 
life, 'r-a-4-! m-dira~ dis^bil^tv ,X i J c^ 
Union or oti-'er dues _ _ _ _ 
Retirement •: pension fund 
Savings Plan 
Credit Union 
Other (specif y) •• Re t: i rement i can 
TOTAL MONTHLY DEDUCT LoNi! )45~. |S~ 
(M3B Net monthly income - t a k e home pay 
L c _ . . . : 
MONTHLY 
Creditor s * FOP "ATF : .-'• A.: BAuAMCL PAYMENT 
^ ^Ge eA^ooaX L*Jr A 
\ > hfe ^ ~7_ neTXP&s' 
TOTAL 
If insutix-,..;:. -:; •. , xxiserL total and 
attach schedulei 
* rmtrr* —^ 
All prope±.-,..v V^ L Lr.,e
 r^ .i;..:e^ M:..JW-.. L O be owned individually or jointly 
(indicate who holds or how title heJd; i H'» husband (Wi Wife or (J) 
Jointly) 
WHERE SPACE IS INSUFFICIENT FOR COMPLETE INFORMATION OR LISTING PLEASE 
ATTACH A SEPARATE SCHEDULE. 
VALJTF OWED 
(a) Household furnishing, furniture, 
appliances and equipment iQ^QOO -IT 
(b) Automobile (Year-Make) 
Z Z Z Z ^ .' ^<DQ ~ 1&— 
{c) S ecu I i t i e si Stocks\bonds 
2 
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(d) Cash and Deposit Accounts (banks, 
savings & loans, credit unions -
savings and checking) $> / dfy 
C i ^ / j ^ n ^ {\<rrawr)r % hv^r S^U^P^K *>j-^r~ Fn^r\cZl 
(e) Life Insurance: 
Name of Company Policy No. Face Amount 
Cash Value 
accumulated 
dividend 
or Loan Amount 
^ 
(f) Profit Sharing or Retirement Accounts: Value of Interest 
Amount of presently vested 
Name : fc^ 
Name : ^Cy 
(g) Other Personal Property and Assets (Specify) 
(h) Real Estate (where more than one parcel of real estate owned, 
information for all additional property) 
Type of Property MflbiL ^ ppnA, Y\UO 
., ., Date of Acquisition r\ua iHffin 
Original Cost $ UPDO - &Q ~ Total Present Value $ ^^GTDO « °rO 
Cost of Additions $ Basis of Valuation,. cost or Additions $ Basis or valuation 
Total Cost $ aJQOO * *D Qjr^n\iAi\sS^^>Z. 
Mortgage Balance $ z_ Other Liens $_
Equity $ And to whom_ 
Monthly Amortiz. $_ 
Taxes $_ 
Ind. contributions$_ 
(i) Business Interest (Indicate name, share, type of business, value 
less indebtedness 
^ = 
(j) Other Assets (specify) 
3 
I 
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are 
6. Total month] y expenses; (Specify which party is the custodial parent 
and list name and relationship of all members of the household whose expenses 
included: _ L P^AQAJL Jx/N P R T T X . /,^ /fteT _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
Husband Wife 
Rent or mortgage payments (residence) _ _ _ ££3QJJ3L 
Real property taxes (residence) _ _ _ _ _ _ 
Real property insurance (residence) 
Maintenance (residence) _____ SU* Gl) 
Food and household supplies . / 00 . &Q 
Utilities including water, e l e c , gas & heat . _ _ I DO - *D 
Telephone .. 
Laundry and i:.I caning _. tfQ. &0 
Clothing _ 
M e d i c a l ' ________ _ _ 
Dental _ ___ _ _ _ 
Insurance (life, health, accident, 
comprehensive disabi1ity) Exc1ude 
payrol 1 deducted * _.. „. ..„, . _ 
Child care _ _ _ . „, 
Payment of child/spousal support re prior 
marriage _ _ , _ _ 
School • ._ _ 
Entertainment (includes clubs, social 
obiigat ions , travel, recreat ion) _____ 
Incidentals (gr oomi ng,, tobacco, a 1 c oho I g :i f t 
donations, including tithing) _____ , _____ 
Transportation (other than automobile) ______ _ _______ 
.Auto expenses (gas oil repa: -- -~^ura: •-.-: ______ IDO*(XO 
Auto payments 
Installment payments (insert rota, and attach 
itemized schedule r ' *\*~ Z •• n-' ^ o r t ! 
(4) _ _ _ _ 
Other expenses (insert to*:a' m d specify or. ai 
attached sheet) .____ „ 
TOTAL EXPENSES 
I declare under penalty of perjury that • at foregoing, :i ncluding any 
attachments are true and correct and that this declaration, was executed on 
the day of _______ .... I9Qs :*:: 
(yxki /JJUL. 
Attorney signature Party's s i d ' n a r f . & r e - - ^ 
(Plaintiff or Defendant) 
BRING TO THE PRETRIAL HEARING ALL DOCUMENTS AND OTHER SUPPORTING INFORMATION 
NECESSARY TO EXPLAIN THE STATEMENTS MADE IN THIS DECLARATION, INCLUDING BUT 
NOT LIMITED TO PAYROLL STUBS FOR THE MOST RECENT 90 DAYS, 3 MOST RECENT TAX 
RETURNS, CREDIT UNION STATMENTS, PASSBOOKS, CHECKBOOKS, CANCELLED CHECKS, 
CERTIFICATES, POLICIES AND OTHER RELEVANT AND MATERIAL DOCUMENTATION. 
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